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Abstract—In political contexts, it is known that people act
as “motivated reasoners”, i.e., information is evaluated first for
emotional affect, and this emotional reaction influences later
deliberative reasoning steps. As social media becomes a more and
more prevalent way of receiving political information, it becomes
important to understand more completely the interaction be-
tween information, emotion, social community, and information-
sharing behavior. In this paper, we describe a high-precision
classifier for politically-oriented tweets, and an accurate classifier
of a Twitter user’s political affiliation. Coupled with existing
sentiment-analysis tools for microblogs, these methods enable us
to systematically study the interaction of emotion and sharing in a
large corpus of politically-oriented microblog messages, collected
from just before the 2012 US presidential election. In particular,
we seek to understand how information sharing is influenced by
the political affiliation of the sender and receiver of a message,
and the sentiment associated with the message.
Keywords. Emotional affect, Sentiment analysis, Information
sharing, Microblogs
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well-understood that political decision-making is
strongly influenced by affective (i.e., emotional) factors [17],
[18], [22], [23]; in particular, political psychologists often
model people as motivated reasoners, where information is
evaluated immediately for affect, and affectively incongruent
(i.e., cognitively dissonant) information is processed differently
from affectively congruent information. One striking instance
of apparently non-rational decision making in politics is il-
lustrated by the “affective tipping point” phenomenon [24]
in which moderate amounts of negative information about a
candidate who is initially liked by a voter increases, rather than
decreases, the voter’s positive stance toward the candidate.
Due to the rise of sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Weibo,
political information is more and more frequently encountered
in a social context: even stories published by mainstream
media sites are often encountered by users after having been
shared by others. Clearly, this social context can influence
how information is interpreted and re-shared. As an example,
we note that there are rational-actor models which predict
the counter-intuitive “affective tipping point” behavior noted
above, in certain social contexts: for instance, it is rational
to behave this way if information comes not from a neutral
source, but from a biased source with different preferences, and
the information is provided with the intent of manipulating the
receiver [21]. Thus, to understand political decision-making
in the context of news disseminated by social media, it is
necessary to understand the interplay between emotion and
the social context of information. It is equally necessary
to understand this interplay to predict how information will
diffuse through a social-media platform.
In this paper, we study the potentially complex interaction
between sharing, community membership, and emotion on
the microblogging platform Twitter. We crawl an appropri-
ate subset of Twitter, and develop a high-precision classifier
for politically-oriented tweets. We also develop an accurate
classifier for the political alignment (liberal or conservative)
of Twitter users. Combining these resources with an external
sentiment classifier for tweets, we are able to test certain
specific hypotheses about sharing and emotion in politics.
Additionally, we build a topic model for our corpus, and
use this to more precisely characterize sharing behavior for
politically-oriented microblog entries—by subject, rather than
in the aggregate.
Other than technical contributions on development of high-
precision classifiers for politic tweets, we also analyze the
frequency of various types of retweet behavior: specifically, we
consider the probability of retweets of type T over all users in
our sample, for several types T defined based on sentiment and
political affiliation of the author of the tweets. (For instance, T
might be “positive tweets from a left-leaning user”). For each
specific type T , since many users who have few retweets are
unlikely to have any retweets of type T , the average probability
thefore is very close to zero. Hence, we also compute the
average over all user with non-zero probability, i.e., all users
that have retweet(s) of type T . Interestingly, these averages
are sometimes qualitatively different, perhaps suggesting dif-
ferent information-sharing strategies across different users.
In considering tweets from a particular community, we also
consider averages over “balanced users” - users who follow
some sources outside their own community.
Our key findings are as follows. (1) For users that have
some retweets of the corresponding type, emotional tweets are
more likely to be retweeted than neutral ones, and negative
tweets more likely to be retweeted than positive ones. (2)
For balanced users, retweets from within the user’s party are
more likely to be retweeted; however, for balanced users that
have ever retweeted an opposite-party tweet, retweets from the
opposite party are more likely. (3) Numerically, most retweets
are of intra-party rather than inter-party. Thus, both sentiment
and political affiliation have effects on information sharing,
though their effects are different for different type of users.
We further characterized patterns of topics in political retweets
with regard to sentiment and political affiliation.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, in political science, Pierce et. al. reported human-
subject experiments on how people handle political informa-
tion from different sources [21]. The experiment tested two
hypotheses related to sharing: (1) the affective transmission
hypothesis, that people are more likely to share information
that engenders an emotional reaction; and (2) the social
transmission hypothesis, that people are more likely to share
information that comes from inside their social group. These
experiments were based on small groups of subjects in a mock
election setting, and one goal of this paper is to test these
hypotheses in a more realistic setting.
Because Twitter has been heavily used for information
sharing, product broadcasting, and political campaigning [30],
[12], [9], [15], studying the flow of messages in Twitter has
been interesting to researchers from a variety of fields. In
non-political contexts, for instance, Wu et. al. conducted a
large scale analysis and found that Twitter users adopt more
information from elite users (i.e., celebrities, famous bloggers,
etc), than from other users within the same community [27].
Zhiming et. al. showed that source features like trustworthi-
ness, source expertise, and source attractiveness have effects
on retweeting [29]. Suh et. al. reported that the presence of
URLs and hashtags in a tweet are useful indicators of whether
a tweet will be retweeted [26]. There is also prior work on the
correlation between retweetability and network characteristics
in general, non-political settings; e.g., Hansen et. al. showed
that negative news and positive non-news tweets are retweeted
more often [14].
In the domain of politics, Berger et. at. investigated a
large number of articles from New York Times and found that
positive and negative content is more likely to be emailed by
readers to their friends [4]. Similarly, Stieglitz et. al. examined
a set of political tweets and found that there is a positive
relationship between the quantity of words indicating senti-
ment in a tweet and the tweet’s retweetability [25]. Another
popular topic of investigation is the effect of social-media
news transmission on information diversity. Conover et. al
examined networks among Twitter users that are formed by
retweeting relationships (i.e., edges are drawn from a user to
other users she retweets) [8]. They found that the network is
highly polarized—i.e., users tend to retweet more from other
users sharing the same political affiliation. Jisun et. al. also
investigated how the diversity of information from mass media
is affected by retweets and sharing behavior [16]. In social
science, Bristor showed that people are more likely to accept
information from highly trustworthy sources [7], and Dodele
et. al showed that information items that engender emotional
reaction are more likely to be shared [10].
All of these prior results in the political domain can be
viewed as relating to either the social transmission hypothesis,
or the affective sharing hypothesis. However, because in each
case the effects of sentiment and community membership are
considered separately, it is not clear how these two factors
interact. In short, while it seems clear that messages are more
likely to be shared if they are either within-community or
sentiment-bearing, we do not know to what extent these influ-
ences can be separated: e.g., it might be that polar messages
are shared more readily, on average, simply because more of
them come from in-group than average. In contrast, our work
considers the effects of sentiment and community membership
both independently and together. We also make use of topic
modeling to obtain more fine-grained descriptions of emotion
and sharing.
III. DATA COLLECTION
We first selected a set of 56 widely-followed Twitter users
which we call the seed users. These users include major Amer-
ican politicians, especially candidates for American presiden-
tial election in 2012, e.g., Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, and
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Fig. 1: Performance of proposed political tweet selection
method
Newt Gingrich; well known political bloggers, e.g., America
Blog, Red State, and Daily Kos; and political sections of mass
media sites, e.g., CNN Politics, and Huffington Post Politics.
Of the 56 seeds, 20 and 23 seed users are left- and right-leaning
respectively, and the remaining 13 seed users are neutral.
We then expanded the set of users by identifying all users
following at least three seed users, leading to a set of more than
408K users. A large part of the following network among those
users1, and tweets from all users were then crawled, with the
goal of collecting all tweets between August and October 2012.
This data thus contains both network and activity information
for Twitter users actively following American politics.
The period from August to October 2012 was chosen for
two reasons. First, since for each user we can only crawl
up to her latest 3200 tweets, it was necessary to restrict
the time range to obtain a relatively-complete sample (the
crawling was done in fall 2012). Secondly, this period is very
politically active, including many events related to the Amer-
ican 2012 presidential election: e.g., the national conventions
of both democratic and republican parties, and the debates
between presidential candidates. In total, this subset contains
127,812,186 tweets published by 349,976 users.
We found that both the numbers of tweets and retweets per
user follow power-law distribution, with many users having
very few tweets or retweets. In order to ensure that we have
a reasonable amount of activity for each user, we further
restricted the dataset to active users, who generated at least
45 tweets and/or retweets, and are active (i.e., post a tweet or
retweet) for at least 15 days. This yields a smaller dataset of
104,119 users, and 105,167,766 tweets, which will be used in
the subsequent analysis.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Political Tweet Selection
Many of the tweets in our dataset are not political in nature,
so the first task was to build a classifier that detects political
tweets. Although learning a classifier is a natural approach,
the rapidly-changing nature of the dataset makes it difficult
to ensure that a learned classifier will properly track political
discourse over time; thus, we manually constructed a high-
precision classifier.
Hashtag selection. A hashtag is a word prefixed by a
# symbol added to a tweet to indicate topic. A tweet can
have zero or more hashtags. We manually selected a set of
political hashtags recommended by mass media streams, e.g.,
the hashtag guide from Washington Post2, and hashtags used
1At the time of this writing, we have completely crawled the following
network for only some of the users.
2http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/post/hashtag-guide-
for-the-2012-election–atmentionmachine/2011/12/05/gIQAOczocO blog.html
by seed users (e.g, Obama first used #dontdoublemyrate to
post tweets about his proposal not to double rates on student
loans). We manually examined all hashtags of the latter type to
filter out those that are not political and those used by fewer
than three seed users. In the end, we obtained a list of 608
hashtags.
Keyphrases selection. Since not all tweets contain hashtags,
we also developed a set of political keyphrases. We took a set
of users that could be manually labeled with respect to political
affiliation of users (as presented below, in Section IV-D), and
aggregated all the tweets of each user that contain one or
more of the political hashtags to form a user-document. We
then ran an LDA model [5] with 50 topics, and for each
topic, we manually examined the topic’s top 20 most frequent
words, and filtered out non-political ones. We combined single
words into phrases when appropriate, e.g., “white” and “house”
are combined into “white house”. From this, we obtained an
additional 224 political keyphrases.
Performance of the tweet selection method. In the end, we
obtained a set of 25,738,776 tweets containing one or more
political keyphrase or hashtag. For each day d, we denote by
Td the set of all tweets posted on the day, and denote by T pd the
set of all tweets posted on the day and selected by our method.
Then, the amount of tweets posted in day d and selected as
political can be measured by selected fraction Fracpd which is
defined as follows
Frac
p
d =
|T pd |
|Td|
The selected fraction of each day over the three months is
shown in Figure 1. On most days, about 20% of tweets are
considered political. This fraction peaks on days associated
with certain political events, as indicated by the vertical lines:
e.g., Romney named Paul Ryan as his teammate on August
11th (day 11); Romney and Obama were nominated by their
parties as candidate for the 2012 presidential election on
August 30th (day 30) and September 5th (day 36) respectively;
and there are also peaks on the days after the debates on
October 3rd (day 65), October 11th (day 73), October 16th
(day 78), and October 22nd (day 84).
As the groundtruth is not available, we evaluate the per-
formance of our political tweet selection method presented
above using daily random samples of tweets that are manually
labeled. To do this, for each day d, we randomly select a set
Sd of 100 tweets from Td, and randomly select a set Spd of 100
tweets from T pd . We then manually labeled these 200 tweets as
political or non-political. The fraction of (true) political tweets
in day d is now can be approximated by sample fraction Fracsd
which is define as follows
Fracsd =
|true Sd|
|Sd|
where true Sd is the set of tweets in Sd that are hand-labeled
as political tweets. Similarly, the precision and recall of our
methods with respect to day d can be respectively estimated
by sample precision Presd and sample recall Recsd which are
defined as follows
Presd =
|true Spd |
|Spd |
Recsd =
|true Sd ∩ T
p
d |
|true Sd|
where true Spd is the set of tweets in S
p
d that are labeled as
political tweets
Figure 1 also shows the sample fraction, sample precision,
and sample recall of all 92 days in the dataset (August 1st
to October 31st, 2012). The figure clearly shows that the
fraction of political tweets selected by our method is similar
to the sample fraction of true political tweets. The figure also
shows that our method achieves high precision (about 90%)
and a usefully-high recall (roughly 60%). Looking deeper into
political tweets in daily samples Sds that are not selected by
our method, we found that most of these tweets do not have
hashtags, or talk about politics using non-political terms.
B. Tweet Sentiment Polarity Detection
To automatically analyze the sentiment expressed in every
tweet, we employ the widely used Stanford’s sentiment scoring
API3. This API implements a machine learning method to
detect sentiment polarity specifically in tweets [1]. For each
tweet, the API turns the tweet content into a score that indicates
whether the tweet is positive, negative, or neutral. We use the
API to score all extracted political tweets. To evaluate the
performance of the API, we manually labeled a set of 1000
randomly selected tweets for sentiment. The overall accuracy
of detected sentiment for this set is 77.9%, which is reasonably
good considering the small size of the tweets.
C. Tweet Topic Modeling
Since we also want to understand sharing behavior at a
more fine-grained level, we built a topic model for our corpus.
Direct application of the LDA model [5] to a collection of
tweets is not appropriate: as tweets are very short, there
is little information in such a corpus on term co-location,
which is what drives LDA’s grouping of terms into topics.
Aggregating tweets from each user to form user-documents (as
we previously did in keyphrase extraction) is also not ideal, as
this approach may assign multiple topics to each tweet, and for
analysis, it is preferable to have a single topic per tweet. Our
solution is to employ the TwitterLDA model [28], a variation
of LDA that constrains each tweet to have only one topic. The
generative process TwitterLDA model is as follows.
• For each topic k, sample a topic-pecific word distribution
φk ∼ Dir(β)
• For each user u, sample a user-specific topic distribution
θu ∼ Dir(α)
• For each tweet t by user u:
◦ Sample a single topic for the tweet zt ∼
Multinomial(θu)
◦ For each word position n in tweet t, sample the word
ωt,n ∼Multinomial(φzt)
To perform inference for the model, we make use of
Gibbs sampling. Here, we leave out the derivation of sampling
equations due to the limitation on space. We first remove all
stop words from tweets. We also remove all infrequent words,
i.e., words that appear in fewer than 5 tweets. Then, we filter
out all users having less than 10 tweets that are not empty after
removing stop words and infrequent words. Next, we divide
the set of tweets contributed by each user into two subsets, one
with 90% of the tweets from that user, and one with 10%. By
combining the larger subsets of all users together, we obtain
the training set. The test set is constructed in a similar way
using the smaller subsets. Finally, to identify an appropriate
number of topics, we run collapsed Gibbs sampling on the
training set, varying the number of topics, and evaluate the
perplexity on the test set.
Figure 2 shows the perplexity of the TwitterLDA model
with respect to the number of topics K . As expected, larger
3http://help.sentiment140.com/api
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Fig. 2: Perplexity of TwitterLDA model
K gives smaller perplexity, and the amount of improvement
decreases as K increases. In consideration of time and space
complexity, we set the number of topics to be 80 in the
experiments below.
D. User Classification
Perhaps the most challenging problem we encountered was
to classify users by their political communities. A natural
approach is to use a machine-learned classifier plus a set
of gold-standard labels like previous works on the problem
e.g, [20] and [6]. However, there are challenges in applying
methods proposed in these works in our case. First, it is not
immediately obvious how to obtain gold-standard labels for the
political affiliation of Twitter users; and second, some features
used in these works are computationally expensive, or not
available due to the partially crawled following network in
our dataset.
To deal with the above challenges, we first used a combina-
tion of manual effort and heuristic rules to obtain the training
set of labeled users. We then used the SVM classifers trained
on tweet-based features, plus a post processing step to increase
confidence. These classifiers are chosen since (1) they were
shown to have a comparative performance with the best ones
[20], and (2) our main objective is not in classifying users but
to obtain a “big enough” set of users whose labels are assgined
with some level of confidence. We present our method in detail
below.
Our first approach was to make use of Twitter bios to clas-
sify users. These bios are user contributed public statements for
self-introduction. Other than background and hobbies, some
users indicate political affiliations in their bios. We selected
bios containing some term (e.g., “Democrat”, “Conservative”,
etc) associated with political affiliation. Unfortunately, this
population of users turned out to be both relatively small, and
quite unrepresentative: manually classifying all bios in the set
produced 1,116 left-leaning users, 10,775 right-leaning users,
and 480 neutral users. These 12,371 users represent about 3%
of total number of users in our Twitter dataset; and only 4,650
of them are active. One worrisome issue is that in this set of
users, right-leaning users outnumber the left-leaning ones by
nearly ten to one, an unlikely proportion even in a social media
that is believed to be more heavily used by conservatives. In
the following, set of all users manually labeled by their bios
is denoted by M and called the manually labeled set (M).
Our second attempt to obtain gold-standard labels was
based on the 56 seed users. The well-documented partisan
division of social media [11] makes it likely that users who
follow primarily right-leaning seeds are themselves right-
leaning, and vice versa. We thus considered the following
heuristic rules:
• Active users who follow Barack Obama but do not follow
any right-wing seed users are considered left-leaning
users.
TABLE I: Performance of different user classifiers: precision
and recall in identifying left-leaning users, and overall accu-
racy. Please refer to text for meaning of different training/test
sets.
Training set Test set
Precision Recall Accuracy
(%) (%) (%)
H −M M 73.4 71.0 94.4
M H −M 92.2 47.9 87.2
90%(H ∪M) 10%(H ∪M) 87.7 77.1 92.8
90%(H ∪M) 10%(H ∪M) −M 77.3 73.4 93.8
90%(H ∪M)
10%(H ∪M) 91.0 80.7 94.6(drop 5%)
90%(H ∪M)
10%(H ∪M) 93.2 84.9 96.2(drop 10%)
• Active users who follow Mitt Romney but do not follow
any left-wing seed users are considered right-leaning
users.
In this set, called the heuristically labeled set (H) below, there
are 15,998 left-leaning users, and 30,900 right-leaning users.
The approximately 2:1 ratio of right- to left-leaning users
in H is much more plausible than the ratio in M . The labels in
H also coincide quite well with the manual labels: we found
that there are 2,204 users in both M and H , and among those
users, there are only 35 (about 1.6%) users which are labeled
differently by the two methods.
Although the sets M and H mostly agree in their labeling,
the distribution of users in these two sets is quite different, so
it is not obvious which is the best set for training a classifier.
To understand this, we performed some experiments using
a SVM4 trained on different training sets and evaluated on
corresponding test sets as shown in Table I. Each user is
represented as a document, consisting of all of her political
tweets, and the features of each user-documents are TF-IDF
scores [19] of the terms contained in the user-document. The
results are shown in first rows of Table I. (The precision and
recall measure the ability of the classifiers to identify left-
leaning users, the minority class, against right-leaning users.)
In addition to M , the manual labels, we consider H , the
heuristic labels, and M ∪H , which denotes the union of these
two sets. In M ∪H , for the 35 users where M and H disagree
on the labels, we take the label from M . We also use M −H
and H −M to denote the appropriate set differences.
The first four rows of Table I show that training on
H−M and testing on M produces fairly good results (94.4%
accuracy), but training on M and testing on H −M performs
much less well (only 87.2% accuracy). This suggests that H
is a more representative training set than M . A random 90%-
10% training-test split of H∪M gives good accuracy (92.8%),
and this result improves slightly (to 93.8%) when the (possibly
non-representative) test examples from M are removed.
We concluded from these experiments that training on a
dataset that at least includes H is highly desirable, and adopted
the classifier from the fourth line of the table (trained on a 90%
sample of H ∪M ).
The classifier we learned is a two-class classifier, which
classifies users into left-leaning and right-leaning. Since we
are not interested in analysis of neutral users, and since most
manually labeled neutral users are generally classified with low
confidence, we also evaluated discarding the users associated
with the lowest-confidence 5% and 10% of the predictions. By
doing this, the accuracy, precision and recall of the classifier
for left-leaning users increases slightly on the test set, as
shown in the last two rows of Table I. We finally elected to
discard the lowest-confidence 10% of the predictions, obtain-
ing 21,948 left-leaning users; 66,118 right-leaning users; and
4http://svmlight.joachims.org/
16,053 neutral users. Among those users, there are 9,023 left-
leaning users, denoted by UL, and 25,398 right-leaning users,
denoted by UR, who we have full information abouth their
follow relationship, i.e., all of their followers and followees,
both included in our dataset or not. Next, our analysis works
were performed on these UL and UR.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Sentiment and Retweetability
We first examine the effect of sentiment independent of
the political affiliation of the sender. Specifically, we look at
tweets sent from and received by members of the same political
affiliation, and consider how the sentiment of tweets affects
the probability of a retweet. More precisely, for each user u in
UL∪UR, and each type of tweet t, we estimate the probability
that u retweets a tweet of type t as the number of tweets of
type t that u retweets divided by the number of tweets of
type t that u receives from her followees. These numbers are
then aggregated over all active users: since our pool of users is
large, even small differences in average probability of retweets
can often be statistically significant.
Figures 3(a) and (b) show box-plots of retweet probability
of tweets among left-leaning users, with respect to four differ-
ent types of tweets. Figure 3 (a) shows the overall probability
over users in UL, while Figure 3 (b) shows the probability
over users in UL who ever retweeted the corresponding type
of tweets. In the figure, L* denotes all tweets received from
left-leaning users; and L+, LN, and L- denote all positive,
neutral, and negative tweets received from left-leaning users,
respectively. Similarly, Figures 3 (c) and (d) respectively show
box-plots of retweet probability for tweets posted by right-
leaning users and received by users in UR and by users in UR
who ever retweeted the corresponding type of tweets, for the
analogous four types of tweets.
From Figures 3(a) and (c), we can see that, in general,
neutral tweets are more likely be retweeted. This may be the a
result of the fact that non-neutral tweets are rare (less than
10%), so most of the retweeting rates of these tweets for
individual users are zero. However, the opposite pattern holds
if for each type of tweet, we only consider users who ever
retweeted tweet(s) of the type (i.e., in plotting L*, we take
all users that ever retweeted any tweet from other left-leaning
users; in plotting L+, we only take users that ever retweeted
any positive tweet from other left-leaning users; and similarly
with the other types of tweets). As shown in Figures 3(b)
and (d), for users who ever retweeted negative or positive
tweets, those emotional tweets are more likely be retweeted
for both political affiliations. We conducted two-tailed tests
showing that, for those users, negative and positive tweets are
statistically significantly more likely be retweeted than neutral
tweets; and negative tweets are also statistically significantly
more likely be retweeted than positive tweets.
Other than using the whole UL and UR, we performed
the same analysis on different subsets of users derived from
these two sets to make sure that we have confidence on results
obtained above. These subsets of users are: (a) UhL - set of
all users u ∈ UL who has a least 50% of her followees in
our set of active users, and U lL - set of all users u ∈ UL
who has less than 50% of her followees in our set of active
users, and similarly we derived UhR and U lR from UR; and
(b) U iLs (i = 1, · · · , 5) - five disjoint random subsets of UL
(users in UL are evenly- and randomly-distributed into U iLs),
and similarly, we derived U iRs ((i = 1, · · · , 5) from UR.
By using UhL/UhR or U lL/U lR, we were able to measure the
effects in the set of users where we are more or less confident
about tweets they received, while by using U iLs/U iRs, we were
able to measure the effects under randomization. Experiments
on both UhL and U lL, and on all U iLs use the qualitatively same
results as in Figures 3(a) and (b); and, similarly, experiments
on both UhR and U lR, and on all U iRs give the qualitatively
same results as in Figures 3(c) and (d). These further confirms
the robustness of the obtained results.
B. Political affiliation and Retweetability
We now evaluate the effect of political affiliation on
retweetability, independently from the effect of sentiment. To
do this, we consider the set of balanced users, defined to be
users who follow some left-leaning and some right-leaning
users. Within UL, we have 8,696 balanced left-leaning users,
and within UR, we have 8,962 balanced right-leaning users.
For these balanced users, we compare the retweetability of
two tweet types corresponding to whether the tweet’s sender
sharing the same or having different political affiliation.
Figure 4(a)(i) shows box-plots of retweet probability over
all balanced left-leaning users in UL, while Figure 4(b)(i)
shows box-plots of retweet probability over all balanced left-
leaning users in UL who ever retweeted tweet(s) of the
corresponding type. In these figures, again, L* and R* denote
all tweets received from left-leaning and right-leaning users re-
spectively. Similarly, Figure 4(c)(i) shows box-plots of retweet
probability over all balanced right-leaning users in UR, while
Figure 4(d)(i) shows box-plots of retweet probability over all
balanced right-leaning users in UR who ever retweeted tweet(s)
of the corresponding type (computed similarly to Section V.
A), for the two types of tweets.
The box-plots in Figures 4(a)(i) and (c)(i) show that, in
general, balanced users are more likely to retweet tweets
from other users sharing the same political affiliation. This
agrees with the social transmission hypothesis of Pierce et.
al. [21]. However, this is not fully true if, for each type
of tweets, we consider balanced users who ever retweeted
tweet(s) of the type. The box-plots in Figure 4(b)(i) show
that balanced left-leaning users who ever retweeted tweets
from right-leaning users are still more likely to retweet tweets
from other users sharing the same political affiliation; while
box-plots in Figure 4(d)(i) show that balanced right-leaning
users who ever retweeted tweets from left-leaning users are
more likely to retweet tweets from other users having different
political affiliation. Though this surprisingly contradicts the
social transmission hypothesis for the community of right-
leaning users, our result agrees with previous works showing
that weak ties are more helpful in dissemination of information
[13], [2].
Similarly to the previous analysis, we performed the same
analysis on subsets of balance users in UhL/UhL/U iLs and
UhR/UhR/U iRs and obtained results qualitatively the same to the
above ones, confirming the robustness of the laters.
C. Sentiment & Political affiliation and Retweetability
Next, we examine the effects of political affiliation together
with sentiment. Figures 4(a)(ii), (iii), and (iv) show box-plots
of retweet probability of different type of tweets over all
balanced left-leaning users in UL, while Figures 4(b)(ii), (iii),
and (iv) show box-plots of the probabilities over all balanced
left-leaning users in UL who ever retweeted tweet(s) of the
corresponding type. In these figures, again, L+, LN, and L-
denote all positive, neutral, and negative tweets received from
by left-leaning users respectively; and R+, RN, and R- denote
all positive, neutral, and negative tweets posted by right-
leaning users respectively. Similarly, Figures 4(c)(ii), (iii), and
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Fig. 4: Inter-political affiliations retweets.
(iv) show box-plots of retweet probability over all balanced
right-leaning users in UR, while Figures 4(d)(ii), (iii), and
(iv) show box-plots of the probabilities over all balanced
right-leaning users in UR who ever retweeted tweet(s) of the
corresponding type (computed similarly to Section V. A), for
the six types of tweets.
Figures 4 (a) (ii), (iii), and (iv), and Figures 4 (c) (ii),
(iii), and (iv) show that, in general, the social transmission
hypothesis holds regardless of sentiment type of the tweets:
both balanced left- and balanced right-leaning users are more
likely to retweet tweets from other sharing the same political
affiliation. However, the opposite pattern holds if, for each type
of tweet, we consider users ever retweeted tweet(s) of the type.
Figures 4 (b) (ii), (iii), and (iv), and Figures 4 (d) (ii), (iii),
and (iv) show that, for both balanced left- and balanced right-
leaning users who ever retweeted emotional tweet(s) from the
other political affiliation are more likely to retweet tweets of
the sentiment type from other users of the opposite affiliation.
It is interesting that sentiment seems to have a stronger effect
than affiliation: in particular, users are more likely to retweet
an emotional tweet posted by a user from a different political
affiliation than they are to retweet a neutral tweet from the
same affiliation.
Again, we obtained results qualitatively same to the above
ones when performed the same analysis on subsets of balance
users in UhL/UhL/U iLs and UhR/UhR/U iRs. This further confirms
the robustness of the obtained results.
D. Topic of Retweets
Next, we investigate the patterns of retweets with regards
to political affiliation and topic. Table II shows the number
of retweets of users across all 80 topics—here each subfigure
shows a particular community relationship, e.g., the top-left
figure shows the topic distribution for tweets both received and
TABLE II: Number of retweets by different topics and by
different political affiliations of the sender and the retweeter
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sent by left-leaning users. Note that all the figures are plotted at
the same scale, hence bar-plots in these figures therefore show
both actual number and topic distribution of retweets. These
figures clearly show that despite the relatively high probability
of retweeting an inter-affiliations tweet (at least on the part
of “balanced” users), numerically, most retweets are of intra-
affiliation tweets. This observation holds across topics, and
agrees with previous findings by Conover et. al. [8].
Table III shows some representative topics, each together
with representative words. Note that we have manually as-
signed labels for those topics. The topics in the table contain
the most popular topics in the intra-affiliation retweets. It is
interesting that Paul Ryan’s Medica plan (topic 52), Economic
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foreign policies (topic 66), and Romney’s taxes (topic 7) are
most popular for in retweets within left-leaning users; while
Facts and news about Republican (topic 42), U.S. consulate
attacked in Benghazi (topic 1) and Jokes about politics(topic
39) are the most popular ones among right-leaning users.
We now look into topic distribution of retweets within the
two political parties. From upper-left and lower-right figures
in Table II, we can easily see that intra-political affiliation
retweets in the two affiliations are distributed quite differently.
The Pearson rank correlation coefficient of topic “popularities”
in the two sets of retweets is only 0.37. (Here, popularity of a
topic in a set of retweets is measured by the fraction of retweets
about the topic.) The low coefficient implies that left-leaning
and right-leaning users have different interests and focuses.
This can be seen quite clearly in Figures 5 where each point is
plotted so the x-position is the fraction of negative retweets for
a political affiliation, the y position is the fraction of positive
retweets, and the color indicates the affiliation in question. The
figures clearly show that, regardless of the affiliation, neutral
retweets are dominant in within-affiliation retweets, while a
number of topics are strongly positive or negative for one
affiliation or the other, but never for both. (In the figures we
exclude topics having fewer than 30 retweets.) This suggests
that, within a political affiliation, there are few controversial
topics.
With respect to Table III, for retweets within left-leaning
users, positive tweets have largest fractions in Olympic and
historic events (topic 61 - where most tweets are bout victories
of U.S teams in Olympic 2012 or about memorial events),
Patriotism and national issues (topic 38), Jokes about politics
(topic 39), and Special days (topic 25 - where tweets are about
reminding events going to happen); while negative tweets
have largest fractions in Previous U.S. presidents (topic 40 -
where tweets are about works by previous U.S. presidents),
Religion and political ideologies (topic 44), Liberalism vs
conservatism (topic 47 - where tweets are about statements
on the opposite affiliation), and Personal opinions about the
candidates (topic 78 - where tweets are personal statements on
Obama and Romney). On the other hand, for retweets within
right-leaning users, positive tweets have largest fractions in The
use of technology in campaign (topic 9), Politics as a football
game (topic 17 - where tweets are about talking politics
using football terms), Special days (topic 25) and Campaign
slogans and report (topic 59); while negative tweets have
largest fractions in Tax related issues (topic 65 - where tweets
are most about tax policies and job creation), Romney’s tax
cut plan (topic 72), Campaign slogans and report (topic 59).
This emphasizes that users having different political affiliations
are not only interested in different political topics, but also
demonstrate different emotions toward these topics.
In Figure 6, we spot out, in within-parties retweets, topics
that have fraction of one type of sentiment tweets more than
fraction of the other type of sentiment tweets. In the figure,
each point is plotted so the x-position is the difference between
the fractions of positivite and negative retweets for left-leaning
users, and the y position is the similar difference for the right-
leaning users. From the figure and with respect to Table III,
we can see that most of topics having much more positive
tweets than negative tweets in within-affiliation retweets of
both the parties (e.g., The use of technology in campaign (topic
9), Republican National Convention (topic 13), Special days
(topic 25), News in big cities & Personal ”checkin” (topic
35), Patriotism and national issues (topic 38), Campaigning
among Republicans (topic 45), Olympic and historic events
(topic 61)) are also directly about the campaign between the
two candidates. On the other hand, most of topics having much
more negative tweets than positive tweets in within-affiliation
retweets of both the parties are related to the campaining
arguments, e.g., Unemployment rate (topic 33), Previous U.S.
presidents (topic 40), Religion and political ideologies (topic
44), Congress meeting on bills (topic 58), or disaster and crisis,
e.g, U.S. consulate attacked in Benghazi (topic 1), and Issues
on Syria (topic 71). Deeper insights from content of tweets
about these topics shows that, though sharing the same patterns
of emotions toward these topics, users having different political
affiliations demostrate different emotions on different aspects
of the topics.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the effects of sentiment and po-
litical affiliation on retweetability of political tweets in Twitter.
Our analysis is performed on a large dataset of tweets collected
from politics oriented users in U.S. during a long politically
active period. Our key findings in this papers confirm that both
sentiment and political affiliation have effects on retweetability
of political tweets. Moreover, we found that these effects are
very different in different type of users: who ever retweeted
tweet(s) of certain sentiment type or not. We also obtained
the previous work’s results about the polarization of political
retweets, and further characterized patterns of topics in the
retweets with regard to sentiment and political affiliation.
A possible opportunity for future work would be to cou-
ple our analyses with more domain-specific and community-
specific models of sentiment [3]. Also, while in this paper
we analyze user behavior in the aggregate, it would also be of
interest to construct models that predict behavior for individual
users, and also that jointly predict sharing behavior, network
structure, and tweet and retweet polarity.
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TABLE III: Topic top words
1 U.S. consulate attacked in Benghazi obama,libya,benghazi,#tcot,americans,president,#obama,american,ambassador,security
9 The use of technology in campaign million,price,jobs,apple,facebook,campaign,bill,steve,people,iphone
13 Republican National Convention #gop2012,#dnc2012,#rnc2012,#rnc,convention,speech,#dnc,#tcot,romney,#romneyryan2012
17 Politics as a football game game,job,ryan,#mlb,patriots,football,#sec,bills,team,#rolltide
25 Special days day,election,job,labor,politics,days,love,night,people,country
33 Unemployment rate jobs,unemployment,obama,rate,job,million,economy,numbers,labor,#tcot
35 News in big cities #nyc,#usa,#chicago,#news,#sandy& Personal “Check in” #us,#dc,#politics,#business,#tcot
38 Patriotism and national issues #tcot,american,flag,god,#neverforget,country,patriot,obama,#obama,patriots
39 Jokes about politics #tcot,obama,#p2,#romneyryan2012,#teaparty,#gop,#obama,#tlot,#lnyhbt,romney
40 Previous U.S. presidents bush,obama,reagan,president,bin,laden,ronald,george,#tcot,romney
44 Religion and political ideologies obama,muslim,barack,communist,president,america,socialist,american,country,hussein
45 Campaigning among Republicans senate,candidate,election,republican,#tcot,gop,sen,party,senator,#politics
47 Liberalism vs conservatism liberal,party,liberals,republican,conservative,republicans,peopledemocrats,women,conservatives
52 Paul Ryan’s Medica plan ryan,paul,medicare,romney,obama,budget,cuts,mitt,obamacare,tax
54 “American dream” american,paul,country,ryan,rick,bill,video,music,job,love
58 Congress meeting on bills congress,obama,house,senate,bill,gop,jobs,budget,republicans,president
59 Campaign slogans and report obama,romney,campaign,#romneyryan2012,president,ryan,#tcot,paul,mitt,ohio
61 Olympic and historic events #usa,american,gold,olympic,usa,medal,#olympics,olympics,china,country
65 Tax related issues jobs,people,government,money,obama,pay,tax,taxes,job,govt
71 Issues on Syria #syria,syria,syrian,#iran,#israel,rebels,turkey,#egypt,war,iran
72 Romney’s tax cut plan tax,taxes,class,romney,middle,cuts,pay,obama,income,rich
78 Personal opinions about the candidates obama,romney,media,liberal,lies,msnbc,dems,job,ryan,campaign
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